

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Chapter 2

Table 2.a. Analysis of worry about the threat of future terrorist attacks, whole sample

| Variable | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Terror Threat | 0.080++ (0.024) |
| Audio Visual Treatment | 0.095++ (0.025) |
| Audio Visual • Terror Threat | -0.032 (0.034) |
| U.S. | 0.216++ (0.025) |
| Constant | 0.162** (0.023) |
| <i>N</i> | 1076 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.144 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for all explanatory measures, with the exception of the constant. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Table 2.b. Factor loadings from emotion battery analysis

| | Anxiety | Positive Affect | Anger | Interested | Uniqueness |
|--------------|---------|-----------------|--------|------------|------------|
| Afraid | 0.761 | 0.028 | 0.190 | 0.038 | 0.383 |
| Scared | 0.756 | -0.017 | 0.211 | 0.083 | 0.376 |
| Nervous | 0.732 | 0.045 | 0.122 | 0.051 | 0.444 |
| Irritable | 0.168 | -0.009 | 0.812 | 0.034 | 0.312 |
| Hostile | 0.286 | 0.021 | 0.738 | -0.056 | 0.370 |
| Guilty | 0.701 | 0.069 | 0.110 | -0.114 | 0.479 |
| Ashamed | 0.624 | -0.091 | 0.289 | -0.079 | 0.513 |
| Upset | 0.424 | -0.021 | 0.659 | 0.113 | 0.374 |
| Distressed | 0.709 | -0.046 | 0.198 | 0.049 | 0.454 |
| Active | -0.007 | 0.629 | -0.032 | 0.352 | 0.480 |
| Alert | 0.095 | 0.222 | 0.100 | 0.771 | 0.338 |
| Attentive | -0.032 | 0.281 | -0.018 | 0.779 | 0.314 |
| Determined | -0.023 | 0.670 | 0.021 | 0.339 | 0.435 |
| Enthusiastic | 0.073 | 0.776 | -0.065 | 0.189 | 0.352 |
| Excited | 0.102 | 0.786 | -0.035 | 0.066 | 0.366 |
| Inspired | -0.020 | 0.769 | 0.040 | 0.084 | 0.400 |
| Interested | 0.025 | 0.532 | -0.062 | 0.529 | 0.433 |
| Proud | -0.100 | 0.700 | -0.015 | 0.171 | 0.471 |
| Strong | -0.070 | 0.741 | 0.090 | 0.137 | 0.419 |

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Table 2.c. Analysis of worry about the economy, whole sample

| Variable | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Economic Threat | 0.095++ (0.028) |
| Audio Visual Treatment | 0.246++ (0.031) |
| Audio Visual • Economic Threat | -0.050 (0.040) |
| U.S. | -0.197++ (0.028) |
| Constant | 0.565** (0.023) |
| <i>N</i> | 679 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.126 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for all explanatory measures, with the exception of the constant. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

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Chapter 3

Table 3.a. Effect of Terror Threat on social trust, 2002

| | Social Distrust 1 | Social Distrust 2 | Social Distrust 3 |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Constant | 0.784** (0.376) | 1.744** (0.627) | 0.866* (0.523) |
| Terror Threat | 0.230++ (0.058) | 0.071 (0.097) | 0.185++ (0.088) |
| Party Identification | -0.026 (0.028) | -0.054 (0.048) | 0.044 (0.045) |
| Ideology | 0.114** (0.038) | 0.055 (0.062) | 0.098* (0.059) |
| Education | -0.176** (0.033) | -0.167** (0.060) | -0.098** (0.050) |
| Income | -0.078** (0.032) | -0.075 (0.052) | -0.181** (0.050) |
| Female | 0.009 (0.096) | 0.022 (0.160) | -0.230 (0.149) |
| Age | -0.010** (0.003) | -0.018** (0.005) | -0.018* (0.005) |
| Asian | 0.693 (0.447) | 0.365 (0.583) | — |
| Latino | -0.257 (0.294) | -1.119** (0.447) | -0.135 (0.411) |
| Black | 0.547** (0.302) | 0.051 (0.454) | 0.248 (0.355) |
| White | -0.694** (0.207) | -1.137** (0.316) | -0.730** (0.280) |
| <i>N</i> | 824 | 397 | 417 |
| Pseudo <i>R</i> ² | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.14 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Dummy variable for Asian is dropped from the third analysis due to perfect collinearity with the dependent variable (resulting from the small number of observations).

Data: ANES 2000/2002/2004 panel study.

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Table 3.b. Effect of Terror Threat on change in social trust, 2000 to 2002

| | Change in Social | Change in Social | Change in Social |
|------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | Distrust 1 | Distrust 2 | Distrust 3 |
| | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient |
| | (Std. Err.) | (Std. Err.) | (Std. Err.) |
| Terror Threat | 0.217 ⁺⁺ | 0.080 | 0.075 |
| | (0.057) | (0.096) | (0.077) |
| Party Identification | 0.007 | -0.039 | -0.024 |
| | (0.026) | (0.048) | (0.037) |
| Ideology | -0.007 | 0.014 | 0.034 |
| | (0.034) | (0.066) | (0.054) |
| Education | -0.022 | 0.057 | -0.007 |
| | (0.033) | (0.059) | (0.047) |
| Income | 0.031 | 0.057 | -0.022 |
| | (0.034) | (0.053) | (0.045) |
| Female | -0.049 | 0.099 | -0.047 |
| | (0.093) | (0.153) | (0.133) |
| Age | 0.008 ^{**} | -0.001 | 0.007 [*] |
| | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.004) |
| Asian | 0.180 | 1.361 ^{**} | -0.814 |
| | (0.440) | (0.636) | (0.534) |
| Latino | -0.242 | -0.468 | -0.115 |
| | (0.283) | (0.509) | (0.511) |
| Black | -0.020 | 0.760 | -0.088 |
| | (0.261) | (0.524) | (0.427) |
| White | -0.380 ^{**} | 0.092 | -0.342 |
| | (0.194) | (0.405) | (0.317) |
| Cut_1 | -0.619 | -0.578 | -0.911 |
| | (0.332) | (0.649) | (0.530) |
| Cut_2 | 1.953 | 2.424 | 1.617 |
| | (0.341) | (0.667) | (0.542) |
| <i>N</i> | 758 | 358 | 392 |
| Pseudo <i>R</i> ² | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.02 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of ordered probit analysis with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is coded as -1 (became more trusting), 0 (no change), and +1 (became less trusting). One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Data: ANES 2000/2002/2004 panel study.

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Table 3.c. Effect of Terror Threat on neighbor trust, 2004

| | Neighbor Trust 1 | Neighbor Trust 2 | Neighbor Trust 3 | Neighbor Trust 4 |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Constant | 2.829** (0.306) | 3.448** (0.290) | 3.147** (0.279) | 2.266** (0.264) |
| Terror Threat | -0.107++ (0.045) | -0.096++ (0.039) | -0.061++ (0.036) | 0.008 (0.033) |
| Party Identification | -0.021 (0.022) | -0.019 (0.017) | 0.002 (0.015) | 0.004 (0.013) |
| Ideology | 0.030 (0.031) | 0.030 (0.026) | 0.029 (0.023) | 0.005 (0.020) |
| Education | -0.002 (0.026) | 0.017 (0.021) | 0.019 (0.020) | 0.040** (0.018) |
| Income | 0.061** (0.024) | 0.039** (0.020) | 0.063** (0.018) | 0.040** (0.018) |
| Female | 0.181** (0.069) | 0.066 (0.054) | -0.047 (0.050) | 0.018 (0.045) |
| Age | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.004* (0.002) | 0.010** (0.002) | 0.008** (0.002) |
| Asian | 0.211 (0.321) | -0.060 (0.264) | 0.132 (0.247) | 0.142 (0.228) |
| Latino | -0.065 (0.283) | 0.647** (0.235) | 0.330 (0.262) | 0.122 (0.227) |
| Black | -0.044 (0.256) | -0.235 (0.237) | -0.173 (0.211) | 0.051 (0.187) |
| White | 0.104 (0.169) | 0.344** (0.158) | 0.073 (0.151) | 0.134 (0.153) |
| <i>N</i> | 681 | 651 | 655 | 648 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.06 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Data: ANES 2000/2002/2004 panel study.

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Table 3.d. Effect of Terror Threat on change in neighbor trust, 2000 to 2004

| | Change in Neighbor Trust 1 | Change in Neighbor Trust 2 | Change in Neighbor Trust 3 | Change in Neighbor Trust 4 |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Constant | 0.462 (0.434) | 0.582** (0.282) | 0.217 (0.276) | 0.100 (0.273) |
| Terror Threat | -0.121++ (0.058) | -0.094++ (0.042) | -0.098++ (0.043) | -0.047 (0.038) |
| Party Identification | 0.000 (0.025) | -0.019 (0.022) | -0.005 (0.021) | -0.021 (0.018) |
| Ideology | -0.032 (0.035) | -0.013 (0.033) | 0.005 (0.032) | 0.023 (0.028) |
| Education | 0.023 (0.033) | 0.006 (0.026) | 0.008 (0.025) | 0.012 (0.023) |
| Income | -0.011 (0.028) | -0.001 (0.023) | -0.002 (0.022) | 0.013 (0.021) |
| Female | 0.017 (0.084) | -0.035 (0.066) | -0.166** (0.065) | -0.077 (0.057) |
| Age | -0.002 (0.004) | -0.006** (0.003) | 0.000 (0.003) | -0.002 (0.002) |
| Asian | 0.849** (0.368) | 0.136 (0.487) | 0.323 (0.365) | 0.279 (0.295) |
| Latino | 0.128 (0.387) | 0.096 (0.261) | 0.393 (0.254) | -0.009 (0.219) |
| Black | 0.237 (0.288) | -0.357 (0.236) | -0.350 (0.228) | -0.113 (0.205) |
| White | 0.148 (0.215) | 0.152 (0.162) | 0.021 (0.132) | 0.006 (0.143) |
| <i>N</i> | 588 | 586 | 598 | 582 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.02 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Data: ANES 2000/2002/2004 panel study.

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Table 3.e. Effect of Terror Threat on feelings toward gays

| | Feelings toward Gays 2002 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Change in Feelings 2000–2002 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Feelings toward Gays 2004 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Change in Feelings 2000–2004 Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Constant | 60.642** (6.580) | –3.084 (8.536) | 36.100** (7.729) | –3.643 (7.346) |
| Terror Threat | –1.784++ (1.041) | –1.606+ (1.074) | 0.406 (1.170) | –1.181 (1.250) |
| Party Identification | –2.114** (0.512) | –0.249 (0.470) | –2.047** (0.511) | –0.171 (0.587) |
| Ideology | –3.118** (0.701) | 0.878 (0.707) | –2.458** (0.769) | 1.340 (0.897) |
| Education | 2.708** (0.553) | –0.468 (0.621) | 3.683** (0.678) | 0.417 (0.719) |
| Income | 1.766** (0.575) | 0.740 (0.589) | 1.637** (0.647) | 0.445 (0.659) |
| Female | 11.016** (1.581) | 2.120 (1.663) | 11.843** (1.845) | 0.650 (1.979) |
| Age | –0.192** (0.052) | 0.055 (0.054) | –0.146** (0.066) | –0.014 (0.075) |
| Asian | –8.284 (6.507) | –5.346 (7.667) | –0.886 (5.551) | –16.211 (10.778) |
| Latino | –2.216 (5.532) | 0.839 (6.238) | 17.861** (7.910) | –5.641 (6.837) |
| Black | –5.243 (5.141) | 3.878 (6.472) | 1.922 (7.416) | –5.455 (7.379) |
| White | –2.636 (3.713) | –1.306 (5.329) | 6.353 (4.649) | –2.840 (3.801) |
| <i>N</i> | 790 | 694 | 642 | 570 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.22 | 0.02 | 0.22 | 0.02 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Data: ANES 2000/2002/2004 panel study.

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Table 3.f. Effect of Terror Threat on opinion over spending on policing unauthorized immigration

| | Spending on Policing 2002 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Change in Opinion 2000–2002 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Spending on Policing 2004 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Change in Opinion 2000–2004 Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|------------------------------|--|---|--|---|
| Constant | | 0.507** (0.207) | | 0.193 (0.211) |
| Terror Threat | 0.164++ (0.057) | 0.008 (0.030) | 0.175++ (0.063) | –0.004 (0.034) |
| Party Identification | 0.053* (0.029) | 0.029** (0.014) | 0.112** (0.029) | 0.029* (0.017) |
| Ideology | 0.120** (0.041) | –0.023 (0.020) | 0.091** (0.043) | –0.041* (0.024) |
| Education | –0.132** (0.033) | 0.018 (0.016) | –0.121** (0.038) | 0.034* (0.020) |
| Income | 0.019 (0.032) | 0.006 (0.016) | –0.011 (0.034) | 0.012 (0.018) |
| Female | 0.028 (0.093) | –0.041 (0.049) | 0.194* (0.102) | –0.022 (0.055) |
| Age | 0.012** (0.003) | –0.002 (0.002) | 0.013** (0.004) | –0.004** (0.002) |
| Asian | 0.220 (0.343) | –0.181 (0.245) | 0.144 (0.436) | 0.228 (0.248) |
| Latino | 0.244 (0.281) | –0.296* (0.155) | 0.355 (0.407) | 0.214 (0.170) |
| Black | –0.165 (0.271) | –0.231 (0.165) | 0.119 (0.316) | 0.392** (0.177) |
| White | 0.122 (0.184) | –0.229* (0.118) | 0.102 (0.216) | 0.127 (0.104) |
| Cut_1 | –0.514 (0.365) | | –0.363 (0.406) | |
| Cut_2 | 0.664 (0.366) | | 1.019 (0.404) | |
| <i>N</i> | 826 | 808 | 655 | 645 |
| Pseudo <i>R</i> ² | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.04 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of ordered probit analysis (data columns 1 and 3) and OLS analysis (columns 2 and 4), all with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Data: ANES 2000/2002/2004 panel study.

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Table 3.g. Effect of Terror Threat on preferences over (decreased) immigration

| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| Constant | 3.631** (0.306) |
| Terror Threat | 0.153++ (0.047) |
| Party Identification | 0.006 (0.022) |
| Ideology | 0.090** (0.032) |
| Education | -0.174** (0.028) |
| Income | 0.002 (0.026) |
| Female | 0.076 (0.076) |
| Age | 0.003 (0.003) |
| Asian | -0.549 (0.380) |
| Latino | 0.052 (0.308) |
| Black | -0.214 (0.253) |
| White | -0.283 (0.177) |
| <i>N</i> | 645 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.13 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. Variable is coded such that higher values (on a five-point scale) indicate less support for immigrants. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Data: ANES 2000/2002/2004 panel study.

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Table 3.h. Effect of Terror Threat on opinion over spending on crime

| | Spending on Crime 2002 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Change in Opinion 2000–2002 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Spending on Crime 2004 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Change in Opinion 2000–2004 Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | | 0.129 (0.197) | | 0.076 (0.224) |
| Terror Threat | 0.101++ (0.055) | –0.010 (0.029) | 0.198++ (0.064) | 0.010 (0.030) |
| Party Identification | –0.006 (0.027) | 0.003 (0.014) | 0.018 (0.028) | 0.000 (0.015) |
| Ideology | 0.023 (0.039) | –0.008 (0.021) | 0.075* (0.041) | 0.018 (0.023) |
| Education | –0.151** (0.031) | 0.008 (0.016) | –0.140** (0.036) | –0.001 (0.019) |
| Income | 0.008 (0.029) | –0.018 (0.015) | –0.024 (0.035) | –0.002 (0.019) |
| Female | 0.375** (0.088) | 0.003 (0.048) | 0.319** (0.097) | –0.062 (0.052) |
| Age | –0.002 (0.003) | –0.001 (0.002) | –0.001 (0.004) | –0.001 (0.002) |
| Asian | 0.380 (0.430) | –0.153 (0.186) | 0.137 (0.504) | –0.077 (0.270) |
| Latino | 0.619* (0.332) | 0.024 (0.164) | –0.070 (0.441) | –0.462** (0.224) |
| Black | 0.365 (0.280) | 0.029 (0.143) | 0.028 (0.368) | –0.138 (0.165) |
| White | 0.094 (0.200) | 0.002 (0.113) | 0.027 (0.249) | –0.098 (0.122) |
| Cut_1 | –1.913 (0.399) | | –1.837 (0.432) | |
| Cut_2 | –0.388 (0.384) | | 0.076 (0.421) | |
| <i>N</i> | 824 | 814 | 655 | 648 |
| Pseudo <i>R</i> ² | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.01 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of ordered probit analysis (data columns 1 and 3) and OLS analysis (columns 2 and 4), all with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++*p* ≤ .05, +*p* ≤ .10 (one-tailed); ***p* ≤ .05, **p* ≤ .10 (two-tailed).

Data: ANES 2000/2002/2004 panel study.

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Table 3.i. Effect of Terror Threat concern on opinion over torture

| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|---------------|----------------------------|
| Constant | -0.267 (0.188) |
| Terror Threat | 0.301++ (0.094) |
| Ideology | -0.126** (0.031) |
| Education | -0.057** (0.025) |
| Female | -0.154** (0.078) |
| Income | 0.031** (0.010) |
| <i>N</i> | 1196 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.03 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of ordered probit analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Data: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations U.S. national survey, 2006.

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Table 3.j. Effect of threat and authoritarian predispositions on tolerance and preferences over crime, MEX06s

| | Tolerance Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Soft on Crime Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 3.203** (0.484) | -0.070 (0.387) |
| Terror Threat | 1.051++ (0.343) | 0.702++ (0.296) |
| Economic Threat | 1.137++ (0.354) | 0.338 (0.297) |
| Authoritarian Predispositions | 1.070+ (0.827) | 0.522 (0.643) |
| Authoritarian Predispositions • Terror | -1.407++ (0.756) | -1.116++ (0.589) |
| Authoritarian Predispositions • Economic | -1.661++ (0.641) | 0.629 (0.607) |
| Ideology | -0.153* (0.087) | -0.139** (0.064) |
| Political Interest | 0.166 (0.151) | 0.136 (0.119) |
| PAN PID | -0.167 (0.240) | -0.173 (0.179) |
| PRI PID | 0.218 (0.330) | -0.307 (0.257) |
| PRD PID | -0.125 (0.308) | -0.210 (0.279) |
| <i>N</i> | 287 | 288 |
| Pseudo <i>R</i> ² | 0.07 | 0.04 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis (data column 1) and probit analysis (column 2), both with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat* and *Economic Threat*, *Authoritarian Predispositions*, and interactions among these variables, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed). Coefficients presented for the interaction terms are the slope of the effect of authoritarian predispositions within that condition (terror threat, economic threat).

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Chapter 4

Table 4.a. Effect of Terror Threat on other trait measures, US04s

| | Moral Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Intelligent Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Cares Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Honest Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Terror Threat | 0.049 (0.151) | 0.233* (0.139) | 0.211 (0.147) | 0.085 (0.143) |
| Status Quo | 0.134 (0.153) | 0.305** (0.134) | 0.213 (0.148) | 0.272** (0.143) |
| Democrat | -0.336** (0.180) | -0.539** (0.147) | -0.666** (0.159) | -0.442** (0.165) |
| Republican | 1.577** (0.217) | 0.961** (0.165) | 1.502** (0.207) | 1.676** (0.201) |
| Female | 0.040 (0.131) | 0.645** (0.114) | 0.080 (0.130) | 0.128 (0.124) |
| Constant | -0.619** (0.169) | -1.811** (0.142) | -0.999** (0.143) | -0.995** (0.153) |
| <i>N</i> | 298 | 299 | 299 | 299 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.320 | 0.320 | 0.400 | 0.390 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. Two-tailed tests used. Significance thresholds: ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$.

Table 4.b. Effect of Terror Threat on other traits, US06s

| | Moral Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Intelligent Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Cares Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Honest Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Terror Threat | 0.370** (0.142) | -0.035 (0.158) | 0.134 (0.160) | 0.356** (0.150) |
| Democrat | -0.323* (0.173) | -0.489** (0.196) | -0.198 (0.189) | -0.365** (0.167) |
| Republican | 0.558** (0.237) | -0.180 (0.301) | 0.221 (0.318) | 0.462* (0.275) |
| Ideology | -0.207** (0.069) | -0.393** (0.078) | -0.458** (0.086) | -0.241** (0.070) |
| Interest | -0.296** (0.109) | -0.109 (0.134) | -0.265* (0.155) | -0.258** (0.117) |
| Constant | 1.335** (0.384) | 1.882** (0.434) | 2.381** (0.423) | 1.672** (0.388) |
| <i>N</i> | 159 | 159 | 159 | 159 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.360 | 0.350 | 0.440 | 0.350 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. Two-tailed tests used. Significance thresholds: ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$.

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Table 4.c. Probit analysis of Vote Bush (US04s) and Vote Schwarzenegger (US06s) with moral trait

| Variable | 2004 | 2004 | 2006 |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | |
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Morality Gap | 0.107 (0.340) | -0.261 (0.437) | 0.639** (0.254) |
| Morality Gap • Terror Threat | 0.739** (0.375) | 0.443 (0.492) | 0.085 (0.421) |
| Morality Gap • Status Quo | 0.314 (0.377) | 0.654 (0.440) | — |
| Leadership Gap | — | 0.864++ (0.480) | — |
| Leadership Gap • Terror Threat | — | 1.358++ (0.725) | — |
| Leadership Gap • Status Quo | — | -0.503 (0.598) | — |
| Terror Threat | -0.529 (0.659) | -2.195** (1.091) | 0.536 (0.475) |
| Status Quo | -0.593 (0.646) | -0.456 (0.708) | — |
| Party Identification | 0.678** (0.130) | 0.613 (0.166) | 0.368** (0.117) |
| Issues 1 | -1.733* (1.028) | -1.426* (0.736) | 0.273 (0.263) |
| Issues 2 | — | — | 0.152 (0.241) |
| Party Identification • Terror Threat | — | — | -0.209 (0.172) |
| Issues 1 • Terror Threat | 0.990 (1.119) | -0.568 (1.005) | 0.129 (0.353) |
| Issues 1 • Status Quo | 0.157 (1.021) | 0.150 (0.699) | — |
| Issues 2 • Terror Threat | — | — | -0.228 (0.318) |
| Constant | -3.331** (0.827) | -3.257** (1.073) | -1.484** (0.361) |
| <i>N</i> | 251 | 251 | 143 |
| Wald χ^2 | 94.84 | 111.06 | 68.51 |
| Prob > χ^2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.859 | 0.887 | 0.434 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Leadership Gap* and interactions with this variable. two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

We test Model 2 only because the Morality Gap * Terror Threat measure is significant without Leadership Gap in the model. The p -value on the interaction term is a test of whether there is a conditioning relationship between the trait and the experimental condition.

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Table 4.d. Probit analysis of Vote Bush (US04s) and Vote Schwarzenegger (US06s) with intelligent trait

| Variable | 2004 | 2006 |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Intelligence Gap | 0.169 (0.259) | 0.302 (0.189) |
| Intelligence Gap • Terror Threat | 0.391 (0.381) | 0.448 (0.288) |
| Intelligence Gap • Status Quo | 0.474 (0.383) | — |
| Terror Threat | −0.292 (0.706) | 0.808 (0.501) |
| Status Quo | −0.363 (0.750) | — |
| Party Identification | 0.645** (0.124) | 0.374** (0.115) |
| Issues 1 | −1.708** (0.831) | 0.332 (0.218) |
| Issues 2 | — | 0.189 (0.215) |
| Party Identification • Terror Threat | — | −0.139 (0.160) |
| Issues 1 • Terror Threat | 0.502 (0.911) | 0.041 (0.313) |
| Issues 1 • Status Quo | −0.123 (0.934) | — |
| Issues 2 • Terror Threat | — | −0.340 (0.287) |
| Constant | −2.948** (0.784) | −1.483** (0.355) |
| <i>N</i> | 251 | 143 |
| Wald χ^2 | 91.74 | 56.60 |
| Prob > χ^2 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.853 | 0.431 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. Two-tailed hypothesis tests used. Significance thresholds: ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

The p -value on the interaction term is a test of whether there is a conditioning relationship between the trait and the experimental condition.

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Table 4.e. Probit analysis of Vote Bush (US04s) and Vote Schwarzenegger (US06s) with cares trait

| Variable | 2004 | 2006 |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Cares Gap | 1.079* (0.622) | 0.809** (0.276) |
| Cares Gap • Terror Threat | −0.096 (0.662) | −0.221 (0.376) |
| Cares Gap • Status Quo | −0.430 (0.636) | — |
| Terror Threat | −1.403** (0.600) | 0.703 (0.506) |
| Status Quo | −0.985* (0.540) | — |
| Party Identification | 0.681** (0.153) | 0.314** (0.110) |
| Issues 1 | −1.316* (0.773) | 0.172 (0.299) |
| Issues 2 | — | 0.123 (0.214) |
| Party Identification • Terror Threat | — | −0.175 (0.158) |
| Issues 1 • Terror Threat | 0.460 (0.859) | 0.294 (0.350) |
| Issues 1 • Status Quo | −0.029 (0.794) | — |
| Issues 2 • Terror Threat | — | −0.256 (0.274) |
| Constant | −2.477** (0.750) | −1.939** (0.442) |
| <i>N</i> | 251 | 143 |
| Wald χ^2 | 52.69 | 59.27 |
| Prob > χ^2 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.885 | 0.468 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. Two-tailed hypothesis tests used. Significance thresholds: ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

The p -value on the interaction term is a test of whether there is a conditioning relationship between the trait and the experimental condition.

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Table 4.f. Probit analysis of Vote Bush (US04s) and Vote Schwarzenegger (US06s) with honest trait

| Variable | 2004 | 2006 |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Honest Gap | 1.024** (0.463) | 0.746** (0.271) |
| Honest Gap • Terror Threat | -0.211 (0.542) | -0.164 (0.358) |
| Honest Gap • Status Quo | 0.347 (0.534) | — |
| Terror Threat | -0.546 (0.764) | 0.454 (0.494) |
| Status Quo | -1.213 (0.866) | — |
| Party Identification | 0.674** (0.145) | 0.332** (0.112) |
| Issues 1 | -1.031 (0.967) | 0.361 (0.255) |
| Issues 2 | — | 0.131 (0.232) |
| Party Identification • Terror Threat | — | -0.120 (0.163) |
| Issues 1 • Terror Threat | 0.334 (1.028) | -0.053 (0.348) |
| Issues 1 • Status Quo | 0.178 (1.005) | — |
| Issues 2 • Terror Threat | — | -0.361 (0.318) |
| Constant | -2.710** (0.799) | -1.569** (0.368) |
| <i>N</i> | 251 | 143 |
| Wald χ^2 | 92.86 | 52.76 |
| Prob > χ^2 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.896 | 0.448 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. Two-tailed hypothesis tests used. Significance thresholds: ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

The p -value on the interaction term is a test of whether there is a conditioning relationship between the trait and the experimental condition.

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Table 4.g. Probit analysis of Vote Bush, ANES panel study

| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Constant | -4.301** (1.086) | Age | 0.006 (0.005) |
| Bush Leadership | 0.771++ (0.335) | Latino | -0.108 (0.644) |
| Bush Leadership • Attacks Somewhat Likely | 1.215++ (0.224) | Asian | -1.245** (0.425) |
| Bush Leadership • Attacks Likely | 0.998++ (0.181) | Black | -1.043** (0.269) |
| Bush Leadership • Attacks Very Likely | 1.276++ (0.405) | Mixed Race | -0.275 (0.398) |
| Attacks Somewhat Likely | -1.532 (1.126) | Income | 0.113** (0.045) |
| Attacks Likely | -0.861 (1.066) | Education | -0.093* (0.056) |
| Attacks Very Likely | -1.317 (1.509) | <i>N</i> | 685 |
| Partisan Identification | 0.452++ (0.049) | Wald χ^2 | 212.710 |
| Ideology | 0.135++ (0.068) | Prob > χ^2 | 0.000 |
| Female | 0.303* (0.170) | Pseudo R^2 | 0.683 |
| | | % Correctly Predicted | 91.09% |
| | | Proportional Reduction in Error | 0.808 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used where we expected a directional effect (Leadership, Ideology, Party Identification), two-tailed tests where we had no such expectation. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

The coefficient and standard error on the interaction terms represent the computed slope and interaction for leadership at each level of the terror indicator dummy variable.

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Chapter 5

Table 5.a. Perceptions of Charisma, CIDE-CSES (OLS Regression Analysis)

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|-----------------|--|------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| | Calderón Coefficient (Std. Err.) | AMLO Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Calderón Coefficient (Std. Err.) | AMLO Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Constant | 4.059** (0.203) | 1.977** (0.236) | 3.360** (0.298) | 2.160** (0.309) |
| Economy | -0.106++ (0.026) | -0.028 (0.028) | — | — |
| Poverty | — | — | -0.212++ (0.052) | 0.141++ (0.058) |
| Unemployment | — | — | -0.093++ (0.048) | 0.005 (0.050) |
| Election | -0.248++ (0.020) | 0.248++ (0.022) | — | — |
| Public Security | 0.154* (0.082) | -0.015 (0.080) | — | — |
| Ideology | 0.013* (0.008) | -0.008 (0.008) | 0.015 (0.011) | -0.013 (0.012) |
| Efficacy | -0.030 (0.020) | -0.046* (0.026) | 0.007 (0.035) | -0.051 (0.033) |
| PRI | -0.972** (0.091) | -0.014 (0.097) | -0.962** (0.133) | 0.312** (0.135) |
| PRD | -0.993** (0.090) | 1.132** (0.095) | -1.489** (0.101) | 1.708** (0.094) |
| Other | -0.607** (0.062) | 0.413** (0.072) | -0.745** (0.091) | 0.587** (0.098) |
| Age | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.003) | -0.006** (0.003) |
| Education | -0.016 (0.012) | -0.020 (0.013) | -0.008 (0.018) | -0.019 (0.019) |
| Male | -0.054 (0.049) | 0.102* (0.053) | 0.075 (0.070) | 0.013 (0.074) |
| Union | 0.042 (0.091) | -0.157 (0.101) | 0.020 (0.130) | 0.087 (0.137) |
| Govemp | -0.164 (0.122) | -0.188 (0.125) | -0.043 (0.180) | -0.255 (0.168) |
| Church | 0.045** (0.015) | -0.017 (0.017) | 0.053** (0.023) | -0.030 (0.024) |
| Indigenous | -0.074 (0.072) | -0.089 (0.077) | -0.162 (0.108) | -0.017 (0.105) |
| White | -0.085 (0.071) | -0.090 (0.079) | -0.116 (0.093) | 0.135 (0.113) |

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|-----------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| | Calderón Coefficient (Std. Err.) | AMLO Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Calderón Coefficient (Std. Err.) | AMLO Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| North | 0.199** (0.073) | -0.060 (0.083) | 0.226** (0.103) | -0.079 (0.107) |
| South | 0.113 (0.085) | 0.004 (0.085) | 0.133 (0.128) | -0.075 (0.126) |
| Center | 0.260** (0.095) | -0.112 (0.105) | 0.166 (0.151) | -0.229 (0.144) |
| Cwest | 0.057 (0.075) | -0.125 (0.086) | 0.279** (0.109) | -0.070 (0.109) |
| <i>N</i> | 1086 | 1084 | 512 | 521 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.48 | 0.43 | 0.41 | 0.40 |
| <i>F</i> | 71.08 | 61.19 | 27.00 | 32.38 |
| Prob > <i>F</i> | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| MSE | 0.780 | 0.845 | 0.784 | 0.817 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Economic Threat and Election Perceptions*, two-tailed tests for all other variables. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Data: CIDE-CSES national survey. Economic questions included in the analyses in data columns 3 and 4 were asked of only half the sample.

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Table 5.b. Effect of Terror Threat on blame Iraq without charisma, US04s

| | Blame Bush Coefficient (Std. Err.) | | Blame Bush Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|---------------|--|-----------------------|--|
| Constant | 4.481** (0.110) | Female | -0.050 (0.108) |
| Status Quo | -0.260** (0.123) | <i>N</i> | 299 |
| Terror Threat | -0.355++ (0.120) | <i>R</i> ² | 0.37 |
| Democrat | 0.074 (0.125) | <i>F</i> | 31.64 |
| Republican | -1.580** (0.168) | Prob > <i>F</i> | 0.00 |
| | | MSE | 0.87 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*; one-tailed statistical significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$ and + $p \leq .10$. Two-tailed hypothesis tests used for all other variables; two-tailed statistical significance thresholds: ** $p \leq .05$ and * $p \leq .10$.

Table 5.c. Determinants of blame attribution, US05s

| | Iraq Coefficient (Std. Err.) | CIA Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Homeland Security Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Environment ⁺ Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Economy Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Katrina Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Constant | 0.485 (0.324) | -0.716** (0.338) | -0.260 (0.343) | -0.598* (0.368) | -0.483 (0.344) | 0.462 (0.321) |
| Terror Threat | -0.076 (0.263) | -0.883++ (0.392) | -0.492++ (0.278) | -0.622* (0.324) | 0.209 (0.279) | -0.248 (0.267) |
| Status Quo | 0.017 (0.274) | -0.029 (0.295) | 0.058 (0.269) | -0.112 (0.287) | 0.319 (0.277) | -0.027 (0.267) |
| Economic Threat | -0.093 (0.268) | -0.100 (0.292) | -0.238 (0.267) | -0.821++ (0.339) | -0.056 (0.279) | -0.061 (0.263) |
| Democrat | 0.474** (0.233) | 0.249 (0.267) | 0.411* (0.241) | 0.235 (0.272) | 0.100 (0.236) | 0.056 (0.226) |
| Republican | -0.362 (0.356) | -0.708 (0.603) | -0.225 (0.402) | — | -0.650* (0.396) | -0.649* (0.380) |
| Ideology | -0.107 (0.071) | -0.063 (0.086) | -0.113 (0.078) | -0.107* (0.063) | -0.054 (0.074) | -0.143** (0.072) |
| <i>N</i> | 201 | 201 | 201 | 201 | 201 | 201 |
| Pseudo <i>R</i> ² | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.11 |
| Prob > χ^2 | 0.0000 | 0.0194 | 0.0006 | 0.0033 | 0.0501 | 0.0001 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat* and *Economic Threat* and for analyses of *Iraq* and *Homeland Security*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed). ⁺Republican variable dropped from analysis due to collinearity.

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

For details on variables and coding, see relevant chapter and appendix in Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Table 5.d. Effect of Terror Threat on blame without charisma, US05ns

| | Iraq | CIA | Homeland Security | Environment | Economy |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Constant | −0.749** (0.305) | −1.805** (0.417) | −0.930** (0.383) | −1.240** (0.348) | −0.472 (0.313) |
| Terror Threat | −0.204 (0.181) | −0.385++ (0.207) | −0.572 (0.611) | 0.075 (0.187) | −0.040 (0.182) |
| Status Quo | −0.111 (0.188) | 0.118 (0.206) | 0.637 (0.528) | −0.074 (0.195) | −0.367* (0.201) |
| Economic Threat | −0.146 (0.198) | −0.131 (0.216) | −1.331++ (0.753) | −0.091 (0.209) | −0.138 (0.199) |
| Democrat | 0.553** (0.159) | 0.566** (0.175) | 0.426** (0.170) | 0.267 (0.165) | 0.304* (0.162) |
| Republican | −0.907** (0.190) | −0.737** (0.313) | −0.775** (0.253) | −0.525** (0.228) | −0.666** (0.224) |
| Education | 0.140** (0.057) | −0.058 (0.067) | 0.030 (0.063) | 0.059 (0.625) | −0.007 (0.057) |
| Political Information Scale | 0.140 (0.057) | 1.698** (0.383) | 0.050 (0.452) | 0.145 (0.300) | −0.205 (0.287) |
| Political information • Security | | | 0.559 (0.803) | | |
| Political information • Control | | | −1.100 (0.701) | | |
| Political information • Economy | | | 1.573 (0.982) | | |
| <i>N</i> | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
| Prob > χ^2 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat* and *Economic Threat* and for analyses of *Iraq* and *Homeland Security*, two-tailed hypothesis tests used for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

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Table 5.e. Effect of Terror Threat on self-sacrifice without charisma, US04s and US05ns

| | US04S Campaign Activities Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US05NS Tax Iraq Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US05NS Homeland Security Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US05NS Social Security Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US05NS Welfare Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US05NS Education Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US05NS Environment Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|--------------------------|---|--|--|--|---|---|---|
| Constant | 0.164** (0.083) | 2.237** (0.285) | 3.230** (0.306) | 4.197** (0.367) | 2.138** (0.354) | 3.458** (0.340) | 3.009** (0.335) |
| Status Quo | 0.524* (0.293) | 0.098 (0.147) | 0.014 (0.193) | -0.395** (0.198) | -0.081 (0.200) | 0.084 (0.214) | 0.126 (0.212) |
| Terror Threat | 0.079 (0.161) | 0.221+ (0.162) | 0.236 (0.186) | -0.199 (0.199) | 0.097 (0.186) | 0.103 (0.207) | -0.050 (0.200) |
| Democrat | -0.076 (0.103) | -0.250* (0.130) | 0.271* (1.600) | 0.778** (0.189) | 0.660** (0.191) | 0.835** (0.199) | 0.785** (0.192) |
| Republican | 1.270** (0.250) | 1.495** (0.199) | 1.325** (0.206) | -0.525** (0.215) | -1.060** (0.202) | -0.527** (0.229) | -0.899** (0.221) |
| Female | 0.044 (0.099) | | | | | | |
| Economic Threat | | 0.109 (0.186) | 0.025 (0.206) | -0.140 (0.223) | 0.224 (0.224) | 0.247 (0.206) | 0.408** (0.206) |
| Education | | -0.018 (0.052) | -0.032 (0.059) | -0.062 (0.061) | 0.085 (0.063) | 0.110* (0.061) | 0.143** (0.060) |
| Political Info Scale | | -0.486* (0.254) | -0.881** (0.307) | 0.213 (0.312) | 1.168** (0.304) | 0.440 (0.325) | |
| Republican • Security | 0.776++ (0.374) | | | | | | |
| Republican • Control | 0.024 (0.517) | | | | | | |
| Democrat • Security | -0.022 (0.190) | | | | | | |
| Democrat • Control | -0.411 (0.305) | | | | | | |
| <i>N</i> | 299 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 |
| <i>F</i> | 14.95 | 16.97 | 8.91 | 8.46 | 21.28 | 11.85 | 20.00 |
| Prob > <i>F</i> | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.44 | 0.28 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.26 | 0.16 | 0.24 |
| Root MSE | 0.811 | 1.21 | 1.41 | 1.51 | 1.47 | 1.53 | 1.50 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat* and *Economic Threat* and for analyses of *Iraq and Homeland Security*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

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Table 5.f. Effect of Terror Threat on self-sacrifice, US05s

| | Homeland Security | Iraq | Social Security | Welfare | Education | Environment |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Constant | 2.335** (0.379) | 1.394** (0.299) | 4.738** (0.407) | 5.222** (0.416) | 5.958** (0.364) | 5.290** (0.377) |
| Terror Threat | 0.102 (0.311) | 0.381+ (0.280) | -0.033 (0.285) | -0.048 (0.323) | -0.032* (0.269) | 0.450 (0.275) |
| Status Quo | -0.145 (0.333) | -0.473* (0.245) | -0.308 (0.319) | -0.147 (0.326) | 0.153 (0.273) | 0.205 (0.315) |
| Economic Threat | -0.510* (0.299) | 0.150 (0.262) | -0.414 (0.287) | -0.201 (0.279) | -0.061 (0.243) | -0.037 (0.259) |
| Democrat | 0.619** (0.266) | -0.001 (0.233) | 0.280 (0.274) | 0.336 (0.290) | 0.018 (0.256) | -0.099 (0.237) |
| Republican | 0.444 (0.437) | 0.530 (0.403) | -0.775* (0.438) | -0.481 (0.435) | -0.776** (0.341) | -1.202** (0.391) |
| Ideology | 0.188** (0.087) | 0.246** (0.076) | -0.135 (0.088) | -0.400** (0.088) | -0.179** (0.069) | -0.225** (0.087) |
| <i>N</i> | 201 | 201 | 201 | 201 | 201 | 201 |
| <i>F</i> | 4.90 | 14.34 | 7.12 | 22.20 | 6.76 | 13.01 |
| Prob > <i>F</i> | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.10 | 0.27 | 0.17 | 0.34 | 0.19 | 0.29 |
| Root MSE | 1.51 | 1.27 | 1.48 | 1.48 | 1.34 | 1.35 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat* and *Economic Threat* and for analyses of *Iraq and Homeland Security*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

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Chapter 6

Table 6.a. Analysis of support for unilateralism in the U.S., US06s

| Variable | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| Constant | 5.556** (0.595) |
| Terror Threat | 0.351++ (0.234) |
| Ideology | -0.709** (0.078) |
| Interest | 0.103 (0.192) |
| <i>N</i> | 155 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.370 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Table 6.b. Probit analysis of support for the UN Security Council having the authority to use military force against a terrorist group, US 2004 and 2006

| | U.S. 2004 Coefficient (Std. Err.) | U.S. 2006 Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------|---|---|
| Constant | 0.525** (0.235) | 0.803** (0.198) |
| Terror Threat | 0.549++ (0.104) | 0.700++ (0.089) |
| Ideology | 0.017 (0.036) | -0.061* (0.034) |
| Education | -0.077* (0.043) | -0.079** (0.026) |
| Female | 0.100 (0.094) | -0.152* (0.083) |
| Income | 0.060* (0.032) | 0.009 (0.011) |
| <i>N</i> | 1114 | 1130 |
| χ^2 | 36.182 | 40.21 |
| Prob > χ^2 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Data: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Web Supplement A. Supplemental tables, by chapter

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Table 6.c. Support for internationalism by negative and positive emotions, US07s

| | Active in World Affairs | UN Peacekeeping | Tough International Laws | Share Intelligence | Support a Military Campaign |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Constant | 0.066 (0.096) | 5.249** (0.116) | 5.058** (0.105) | 4.249** (0.098) | 4.532** (0.112) |
| Negative Emotion | -0.043 (0.096) | -0.137 (0.116) | -0.105 (0.105) | 0.037 (0.099) | -0.049 (0.112) |
| Positive Emotion | 0.134+ (0.097) | 0.235++ (0.116) | -0.012 (0.105) | 0.021++ (0.099) | 0.189++ (0.112) |
| <i>N</i> | 173 | 173 | 173 | 173 | 173 |
| <i>R</i> ² /Pseudo <i>R</i> ² | 0.009 | 0.031 | 0.006 | 0.027 | 0.018 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of probit analysis (data column 1) and OLS analysis (columns 2–5), all with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for negative emotion and positive emotion, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

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Table 6.d. Support for measures to protect the homeland in the U.S. and Mexico, 2004 and 2006

| | Mexico 2004 | Mexico 2004 | Mexico 2006 | Mexico 2006 | U.S. 2004 | U.S. 2004 | U.S. 2006 | U.S. 2006 |
|-----------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Control Goods | Control People | Control Goods | Control People | Control People #1 | Control People #2 | Control People #1 | Control People #2 |
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Constant | 0.274* (0.150) | 0.286** (0.143) | 0.570 (0.141) | 0.643 (0.146) | 2.899 0.086 | 2.961** 0.092 | 2.923** (0.082) | 2.492** (0.134) |
| Terror Threat | 0.494++ (0.103) | 0.442++ (0.100) | 0.444++ (0.084) | 0.418++ (0.090) | 0.284++ (0.045) | 0.121++ (0.047) | 0.335++ (0.039) | 0.174++ (0.062) |
| PAN | 0.291** (0.120) | 0.428** (0.119) | 0.146 (0.101) | -0.074 (0.104) | — | — | — | — |
| PRI | 0.121 (0.103) | 0.022 (0.097) | -0.073 (0.113) | -0.195* (0.118) | — | — | — | — |
| PRD | 0.226 (0.171) | 0.304* (0.168) | -0.194* (0.116) | -0.014 (0.129) | — | — | — | — |
| Ideology | — | — | — | — | -0.051 (0.013) | -0.077** (0.014) | -0.095** (0.014) | -0.060** (0.022) |
| Education | 0.043** (0.022) | 0.051** (0.021) | (0.019) 0.018 | (0.020) -0.018 | -0.093 (0.016) | -0.094** (0.018) | -0.083** (0.011) | -0.069** (0.013) |
| Female | -0.125 (0.088) | 0.046 (0.084) | 0.036 (0.080) | 0.070 (0.084) | -0.054 (0.033) | -0.028 (0.039) | 0.007 (0.034) | -0.007 (0.007) |
| Income | 0.052 (0.040) | -0.030 (0.037) | 0.018 (0.022) | -0.018 (0.023) | -0.019 (0.012) | 0.001 (0.013) | 0.006 (0.004) | 0.000 (0.005) |
| <i>N</i> | 1331 | 1331 | 1380 | 1384 | 1155 | 1134 | 1187 | 1186 |
| χ^2/F | 49.219 | 44.858 | 38.43 | 31.29 | 25.63 | 15.18 | 40.07 | 7.80 |
| Prob > χ^2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis (U.S.) and probit analysis (Mexico), both with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys for U.S. and Mexico, 2004 and 2006.

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Table 6.e. Analysis of support for security over civil liberties in the U.S., US05ns and US05s

| | US05ns Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US05s Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Constant | 3.795** (0.417) | 2.824** (0.222) |
| Terror Threat | 0.309+ (0.231) | 0.523+ (0.323) |
| Economic Threat | -0.038 (0.251) | 0.120 (0.311) |
| Status Quo | 0.017 (0.251) | -0.178 (0.295) |
| Education | 0.066 (0.074) | — |
| Political Info | -1.694** (0.353) | — |
| <i>N</i> | 397 | 201 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.061 | 0.027 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

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Table 6.f. Analysis of support for increased spending on homeland security in the U.S., US05ns, US05s, and US06s

| | US05ns Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US05s Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US06s Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Constant | 6.090** 0.326 | 3.941** (0.232) | 6.502** (0.576) |
| Terror Threat | 0.244 (0.201) | 0.304 (0.305) | 0.875++ (0.227) |
| Economic Threat | -0.080 (0.226) | -0.451+ (0.323) | — |
| Status Quo | 0.034 (0.231) | -0.545* (0.329) | — |
| Education | -0.204** (0.071) | — | — |
| Political Info | -1.416** (0.313) | — | — |
| Ideology | | | -0.626** (0.071) |
| Interest | | | 0.030 (0.175) |
| <i>N</i> | 397 | 199 | 152 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.125 | 0.046 | 0.332 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat* and *Economic Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

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Table 6.g. Analysis of support for a tax to increase spending on homeland security, US05ns and US05s

| | US05ns Coefficient (Std. Err.) | US05s Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Constant | 3.809** (0.331) | 3.373** (0.233) |
| Terror Threat | 0.261+ (0.195) | 0.178 (0.316) |
| Economic Threat | 0.060 (0.215) | -0.542++ (0.306) |
| Status Quo | 0.028 (0.207) | -0.268 (0.328) |
| Education | -0.039 (0.064) | — |
| Political Info | -1.063** (0.322) | — |
| <i>N</i> | 407 | 201 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.050 | 0.031 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat* and *Economic Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).

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Table 6.h. Analysis of support for increased spending on homeland security, ANES panel study

| | 2002 | 2004 |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Homeland Security | Homeland Security |
| | Coefficient (Std. Err.) | Coefficient (Std. Err.) |
| Constant | 2.978** (0.215) | 3.415** (0.243) |
| Terror Threat | 0.103++ (0.046) | 0.125++ (0.058) |
| Party ID | 0.060** (0.018) | -0.083** (0.02) |
| Education | 0.042 (0.027) | -0.056 (0.036) |
| Income | 0.011 (0.021) | -0.017 (0.025) |
| Female | 0.178** (0.081) | 0.088 (0.103) |
| <i>N</i> | 474 | 373 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.054 | 0.066 |
| <i>F</i> | 6.275 | 6.47 |
| Prob > <i>F</i> | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: Coefficients are the results of OLS analysis with robust standard errors. One-tailed hypothesis tests used for *Terror Threat*, two-tailed tests for all other variables and analyses. Significance thresholds: ++ $p \leq .05$, + $p \leq .10$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$ (two-tailed).